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Re-Codifying C ivil Law in  H ungary
Codification of civil law in Hungary was a long and diverse process. Codifi­
cation ideas got central attention only in the beginning of the 20th century. 
In 1902 a version of the general part of a future civil code was drafted but 
never became a binding legal document. The Private Law Draft from 1928 
is considered the first complex attempt to regulate all classic areas of civil law 
in Hungary in one code. Eventually, this draft did not enter into force either, 
however its draft provisions made a remarkable impact on judicial practice 
and the continuing codification ideas.1 The first Hungarian Civil Code was 
adopted in 1959, in an era that had no significant interest in establishing 
a modern core of civil law. Still, Act IV of 1959 (hereinafter: Civil Code of 
1959 or the old Civil Code) was a relatively modern achievement that could 
serve the needs of civil society for more than half a century through many 
amendments. The Civil Code of 1959 regulated classic areas of civil law with 
a surprisingly modern attitude. Law of persons, property, contracts, obliga­
tions and succession all got flexible and clear legal background through the 
text of the old Code. The reason why the dominance of Soviet ideas did not 
influence the Code significantly is that civil law was considered a truly pro­
fessional area and politics did not pay much attention to this. Despite of the 
modernity of the Civil Code of 1959 some understandable restrictions were 
obvious in the regulative concept. Most importantly the freedom to establish 
business associations was completely missing from the adopted Code as the 
state practiced exclusive dominance over all business activities. Still, protec­
tion of personality rights and private property along with a modern approach 
to freedom of contract were all present in the original text of the old Code 
and could serve the needs of the Hungarian society for decades, even after 
the constitutional change of the political regime in 1989. In 1977 a complex
1 See: K. Szladits, A m agya r m a ga n jo g  vazlata 1—2, Budapest 1933.
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novel2 amended the Code in order to open to the Western ideas of business 
law and implemented new provisions that guaranteed more freedom to ci­
tizens to conduct business activities. After the shift, the old Code was also 
modified to suit the changed needs of society, mainly to open towards new 
possibilities in the establishment of business and civil associations. Probably 
the main reason while the core of the Code could still survive two and a half 
decades after the shift is that company law was never a part of it. The legisla­
tor decided to enact a separate code for company law in 19883 and the Civil 
Code incorporated only definitive provisions for companies, while detailed 
rules were placed in the company code. At very early stages of reorganizing 
the constitutional regime in Hungary, the requirement for a new and revi­
sed Civil Code was communicated from the government and a committee 
was established in 1989 to work on the theoretical foundation of the future 
code.4 This first initiative was more of a scientific project than a real re-codi­
fying process, so it never led to serious drafting actions. Governmental decree 
1050/1998 (April 24th) started the active re-codifying process with an exact 
assignment given to a Codification Committee and its Editorial Chapter and 
supplied them with financial support. The re-codifying process got to an end 
in 2013 when the Parliament adopted Act V  of 2013 on the Civil Code (he­
reinafter: the new Civil Code or the new Code or Civil Code of 2013) that 
entered into force on March 15th in 2014.
This paper aims to describe basic questions and theories behind the new 
Code and to demonstrate what circumstances and needs led to the adoption 
of the new Civil Code. Naturally, the length of the essay does not allow us 
to give a detailed description of all new legal institutions and conceptual, 
theoretical changes in the long process of codification, so we focus on real 
shifts in paradigms and professional and political considerations and influen­
ces during the process.
The way toward the new Civil Code
In case of such enormous legal columns as the civil code no codification is 
short and easy. All governments reigned during the re-codifying process in 
Hungary were committed to involve academics and practitioners in the work 
and provide publicity to the debates and drafts along the birth process. After 
the above-mentioned governmental decree in 1998 effectively marked the
2 Act IV of 1977 on the amendment and unified text o f the Civil Code of 1959 (entered into 
force on March 1st 1978).
3 Act VI o f 1988 on business associations (1st Company Code of Hungary).
4 Members of the committee were Professors Tamas Sarkozy, Attila Harmathy and Lajos Vekas.
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launch of the project, the Codification Committee established an academic 
journal dedicated exclusively to articles and papers about the new Civil Code 
and its theoretical background.5 The Committee published the Conception 
of the New Civil Code in 2002, revealing the structure along with theoretical 
and conceptual questions of the forthcoming code. The Conception did not 
contain actual draft texts for future provisions. The Conception dealt with 
theoretical issues to be resolved in the new Civil Code. It also marked what 
provisions of the Civil Code of 1959 should be left untouched as the Con­
ception only described those in need for a change. The document, therefore, 
stipulated primarily the theoretical bases of the reform, its regulatory guideli­
nes, the content limits of the new Civil Code and its structure. A remarkable 
approach of the Conception was the way it handled the use of foreign mo­
dels. As the Codification Committee followed this idea along the long way 
of codification, the Conception did not intend to adopt one foreign model 
or civil code as a guiding pattern, it rather drew examples of foreign models 
and ideas liberally. However, the Committee did not deny the obvious con­
nection between the Civil Code of 1959 and its theoretical foundations with 
the German6 and Austrian7 Civil Codes. This is why the models of these 
two countries were specifically examined in the process of working on the 
Conception. The Dutch Civil Code8 seemed the most modern work and 
the Conception did not deny how important the result of an almost 50 year 
long Dutch codification process could be for the Hungarian legislator. Still, it 
acknowledged that ‘f r om  severa l p o in ts o f  v iew  (first a n d  fo r em o st in term s o f  the 
liv in g  cond ition s to b e regu la ted  a n d  th e stru ctu re o f  th e c iv i l  code), this c iv i l  cod e 
(th e D utch C iv il C ode) can  also serv e as a m od el f o r  H ungarian reform , bu t it 
cann ot b e taken as a regu latory m od el f o r  th e en tire cod ifica tion .9 In addition to 
the national civil codes, the Hungarian reform also derived from internatio­
nal documents, namely the Vienna Sales Convention, the UNIDROIT Prin­
ciples of International Commercial Contracts10 and the Principles of Europe­
an Contract Law11. The Conception also recognized that legislative elements
5 Title o f the journal was ’Polgari Jogi Kodifikacio’ (published 48 issues between 1999 and 2008) 
for a complete list of contents visit: www.jogiforum.hu/folyoiratok/20/514 [20.06.2014].
6 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) (1896).
7 Österreich Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1812).
8 Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) (1992).
9 L. Vekas, C oncep tion  a n d  th e R egu la tory Syllabus o f  th e N ew  C iv il Code, M agyar Közlöny 2003, 
No. 8. P. 6.
10 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, www.unidroit.org/eng- 
lish/principles/contracts/principles2010/blackletter2010-english.pdf [10.06.2014s.
11 P rin cip les o f  E uropean C on tra ct Law, ed. O. Lando, Kluwer Law International 1999, Vol. 1—2, 
No. 3.
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of the European Union had a direct influence on the reform of civil rights in 
several areas. Finally, the Conception marked the integration, over the bro­
adest possible range, of private law regulations stipulated in specific laws and 
the results of four decades of judicial practice. Not long after the release date 
of the Conception, the Conception and the Regulatory Syllabus of the New 
Civil Code12 was published. The Regulatory Syllabus showed some changes 
in paradigms as those were stated in the Conception13, and also added textual 
drafts to the conceptions. The Regulatory Syllabus stated the first complete 
draft of the new Civil Code must have been ready by September 30th in 2005. 
The Committee kept this deadline and handed over the first draft to the 
Ministry of Justice that made it available on its website early 2006. The first 
half of 2007 was spent with a complex professional debate over the draft in­
volving universities, courts, public bodies, chamber of commerce and various 
civil and professional organizations and associations. On August 30th 2007 
the Ministry ofJustice suddenly decided to implement the recommendations 
in the draft by itself and dismissed the Codification Committee. The reason 
for this shift was that the Ministry found the process an endless debate over 
these recommendations and wanted to keep a short deadline in order to de­
liver the draft to the Parliament as soon as possible. Legal professionals and 
academics especially debated over this decision of the Ministry14 and feared 
the professional work of the Committee would be of waste in the hands of 
politicians. The dismissed Committee published its version of the reconsi­
dered draft with detailed reasoning in order to make the public know what 
recommendations they consider relevant and important to be implemented 
in the text.15 The first draft bill of the new Civil Code was ready by May 
28th 2008 and the Hungarian Parliament adopted it in September 2009. The 
Hungarian President at that time, Dr. Laszlo Solyom, a well-respected private
12 L. Vekas, C oncep tion  a n d  th e R egu la tory Syllabus o f  th e N ew  C iv il C ode, M agyar Kozlony 2003, 
No. 8, also adopted by the Hungarian Government in the 1003/2003 (January 25th) Govern­
mental Decree.
13 The most notable shift in ideas was how the institution of restitution (pain award) and dam­
ages for non-pecuniary loss were treated in the two documents. W hile the Conception aimed 
to sustain damages for non-pecuniary loss and keep it as a compensatory instrument to pro­
vide damages for obvious personal injuries, pain award would have been a pure instrument for 
protecting all rights relating to personality, independently from the fact whether the plaintiff 
could verify any loss he suffered as a direct consequence of the infringement. The Regulatory 
Syllabus gave up the dualist idea and created only pain award, excluding damages for non- 
pecuniary loss from the system. The latter concept was kept in the final version of the Code.
14 Idem, B ira la t es jo b b i t o  eszrevetelek  az u j Ptk. korm anyjavaslatahoz , M agyar Jog 2008, No. 55, 
p. 65-76 .
15 Idem, Szakertoi ja v a s la t  az u j P o lga r i T orvenykonyv tervez eteh ez , Budapest 2008.
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law professor sent the bill back to the Parliament for reconsideration, exer­
cising his limited veto rights over legislation. The President’s main concerns 
were around the new regulations of legal competency and its limitations and 
many other legal institutions that did not take into account the decisions of 
the Codification Committee. The Parliament readopted the bill with almost 
no modifications and Act CXX of 2009 on the new Civil Code was adopted 
on November 9th 2009. The Parliament wanted to celebrate the 50th anni­
versary of the validity of the old Civil Code16, so according to its intents, the 
first two books of the new Code (General provisions, Law of Persons) should 
have entered into force on May 1st 2010. The Constitutional Court annulled 
the executive bill17 containing this proposed date.18 The Constitutional Court 
found that such a short period of time between the adoption and the effec­
tiveness of these important regulations concerning the law of persons is not 
enough to provide time for the society and professionals for preparation. The 
short time lapse was against the predictability and legal order clauses of the 
Constitution.19 The year 2010 also marked Parliament elections in Hungary 
and the new government revoked Act CXX of 2009 and rehabilitated/reesta­
blished the Codification Committee on June 10th.20 New and continuing 
assignment was give to Professor Lajos Vekas, former and new leader of the 
Committee to finish their work. The Committee finished the draft of the new 
Civil Code and handed it over to the government on December 16th 2011. 
During the Parliamentary debate several amendments were made on the draft 
that, however, did not affect the structure and conception of the Committee’s 
draft significantly. Legal aspects of civil partnership under family law were 
the main target area of such modifications. While the Committee wanted to 
provide civil partnerships under family law an almost equal protection and 
legal background as marriage enjoys, the Parliament implemented significant 
restrictions on it in order to support marriage over civil partnerships.21 Act V 
of 2013 on the Civil Code was adopted on February 11th 2013.
16 Act IV of 1959 was entered into force on M ay 1st 1960.
17 Act XV of 2010 on the entry into force and execution of Act CXX of 2009 on the Civil Code.
18 51/2010. Constitutional Court Decision (April 28th).
19 Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Constitution became inef­
fective on January 1st 2012 as the Fundamental Law — the new Constitution of the country 
— replaced it.
20 1129/2010. (June 10th) Governmental Decree.
21 If civil partners cannot meet certain conditions (most importantly they do not have a com­
mon child) their relationships is only considered an obligation and bears no significance from 
a fam ily law angle.
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Reasons and motivations behind the re-codifying process
Civil Code of1959 was a remarkably modern legal work that preceded its age 
and most importantly surpassed the defects of the political regime in which it 
was originally drafted. After many modifications and the adoption of separa­
te bills to regulate private law matters -  most importantly in the area of com­
pany law, family law and selected business contracts -  the old code looked 
a bit weary and even judicial practice delivered contra legem  interpretations of 
it in order to provide frameworks to modern business needs.
Market economy environment needed a much more flexible and com­
plex code that relies on the complete recognition and protection of private 
property, free enterprise and the extensive acknowledgement of contractual 
freedom. These free basic freedoms or fundamental pillars of private law co­
uld have been traced in the old code as well, however especially the areas of 
company law and the law of associations seemed more of a matter of public 
law in the old Code as mandatory rules governed the types and forms of such 
associations leaving less freedom to founders and members when drafting the 
instrument of constitution.
Regarding the pillar of contractual freedom, the new Code had to take 
into account that any restrictions on this freedom can only be justified when 
it is indispensably necessary, mainly when a weaker party (e.g. a consumer) 
is present in the contractual relationship or limitations are justified by ethical 
considerations. On the other hand the old Code was originally created to 
serve civil contracts rather than business contracts, as private business law 
was almost non-existent during the Soviet regime. After the political shift 
amendments on the old Code tried to satisfy the two otherwise very different 
interests and needs creating mostly unified rules for the same type of con­
tract. The new Civil Code has a certain business character and it aims to pro­
vide flexible background provisions for business contracts. It also has a strong 
consumer protection sense integrated among the general rules of contracts in 
order to handle situations differently in cases when one contractual party is 
acting outside his or her professional needs and procedure and therefore he/ 
she is considered a consumer.
As the three freedoms or pillars of modern private law (protection of pri­
vate property, free enterprise, contractual freedom) were the guiding lines 
for the Codification Committee members, the vast majority of norms in the 
new Code are dispositive and only very few cogent rules can be traced among 
its text. It mainly contains model rules to fill the gaps in the relationship of 
the parties on one hand, while on the other hand parties can easily overwrite
Re-Codifying Civil Law in Hungary 79
these rules in most cases to form the legal relationship between them to their 
personalized needs. The dispositive regulatory method was already obvious 
regarding the law of obligations and contracts but seemed more of an excep­
tion in the area of company law and the law of private associations. Even if 
the former company code22 had many dispositive rules for general partner­
ships, limited partnerships and the limited liability company, derogation was 
only available if the company code gave specific license to the parties. The 
closed circle of associations did not only mean the types of such associa­
tions are determined by the law but it also prescribed their internal structure 
and operation with cogent norms. The new Civil Code however gave up on 
this strict and cogent regulatory idea and implemented a very liberal, mainly 
dispositive approach. Some rules are still cogent but only if ethics or the 
protection of weaker parties require so. We will discuss what difficulties this 
completely dispositive regulatory method may result especially in the field of 
company law later. On the other hand it must be emphasized that providing 
such freedom to citizens and legal entities also mark very clear boundaries for 
the sovereign as well. While reducing any exceptional restraints as much as 
possible on the autonomous actions of private individuals, the cases of state 
or judicial intervention are also clearly determined in the new Civil Code.
Structure o f the new Code
The Civil Code of 1959 had six chapters: general provisions, persons, pro­
perty, contracts (obligations), law of succession, closing provisions. The old 
Code consisted of 689 Sections. Company law and family law23 were tra­
ditionally separately regulated in two different bills in Hungary before the 
validity of the new Code. Even if these areas of private law were regulated in 
separate legislative sources, both referred to the old Civil Code as many legal 
institutions could have been interpreted only under the Code’s provisions 
(e.g. preemptive rights, statutes of limitation, etc.). This is why in the re-codi­
fying process the codex-like nature of the new Civil Code was a desired goal.
In the environment of modern market economy only adequately abstrac­
ted and systemized norms can fulfill the needs of society. Therefore the new 
Code must coherently systemize norms and create uniform terminology for 
most private law institutions. Even if some private law rules remained outside 
the new Civil Code24, the new Code, to the greatest degree possible, provided
22 Act VI o f 2006 on Business Associations (3rd Company Code of Hungary).
23 Act IV of 1952 on Family Law.
24 See for example Act CLXXVI of 2013 on transformation, merger and separation o f legal per­
sons.
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unified terminology and institutional background to all areas of civil law. It 
was a decision to make on what areas should be integrated in the new Code 
and which columns of private law will remain in separate legal sources. Fa­
mily law and company law got full recognition as vital elements of private 
law issues and therefore these fields are integrated in the new Code. On the 
other hand, the law of intellectual property seemed too diverse containing 
many procedural and public law rules and this is why copyright law, patent 
law, industrial property law and trademarks could not be integrated in the 
new Code. As providing full autonomy to persons through mainly dispositive 
rules determined and governed the codification process, such absolute rights 
as it is the case with IP law would have stretched the coherent regulatory fra­
mework of the Civil Code. Various IP law instruments are still regulated in 
different and separate legal sources.25
The new Civil Code was built on the monist principle as it embraces 
private law relations of both private persons and professional actors on the 
business market. Trade rules and civil rules are both integrated in the Code 
and can be used to fulfill the needs of two very different worlds. As a conse­
quence of the monist principle, general rules of contracts were framed so that 
they are able to organize the relations of every legal entity and there was no 
need for special norms. As for special rules for each type of contract the asser­
tion of the monist principle had to be ensured. In the first place, the types of 
contracts in the business world (mainly consignment, carriage, forwarding, 
agency) were modeled to this level of expectations. In case of contract types 
playing an important role in both worlds (business and private relations), 
the level of requirements of professional business life seem to get more si­
gnificance (sales, leasing, professional services). Those types of contracts that 
function almost exclusively in the relations of private persons (maintenance 
agreements, donations and gifts, lending agreements) are relatively few in 
number, so the business oriented regulatory approach and the monist con­
cept seemed easier in order to avoid repetitions of many general rules that are 
applicable in both worlds.
As a result of this monist concept, the long debated detached nature of 
company law could not have been maintained. The Codification Committee 
acknowledged that the integration of company law, a relatively dynamic and 
fast changing area of private law might cause some anomalies requiring more 
frequent future amendments of the Code than desired, these disadvantages 
are still surpassed by the advantages of having a uniform Code on all impor­
25 Act XXXIII of 1995 on Patents, Act XXXVIII of 1991 on Industrial Patterns, Act XI of 1997 
on Trademarks.
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tant private law relations.26 Integration of family law did not generate such 
debates as its pure and less complex institutions between private persons were 
always considered to be a part of classic civil law.
The new Civil Code followed a book-like structure, like its Dutch equiva­
lent. It contains eight books and 1596 Sections, around 4000 norms. Book 
one contains introductory provisions defining the scope of the Code and its 
general principles (good faith and fair dealing, reasonable conduct, prohibi­
tion of abuse of rights). Book two bears the title ‘Man as a subject at law’. 
This book is considered to be the first part of the law of persons as book three 
deals with legal persons. Book two contains rules of legal capacity, legal com­
petency and rights relating to personality protection. It also serves as a link 
between the Code and various IP law acts with declaring that the Civil Code 
shall apply to matters falling within its scope, which are not governed by 
the legislation on copyright and industrial property rights.27 Book three on 
legal persons is a giant part of the codex with its 406 paragraphs. Beyond the 
general rules relating to legal persons book three provide detailed regulations 
on civil associations, business associations (general partnerships, limited part­
nerships, limited liability companies and shareholders companies), coopera­
tive societies, economic interest groupings and foundations. This book only 
rescued purely private law norms from the formerly separate acts on business 
associations and cooperative societies leaving the more procedural, technical 
and accounting norms for separate legislation. Some state that this regula­
tory method actually made it more difficult to identify the rules of business 
associations and cooperative societies as instead of having a unified act on 
these matters, new rules shall be looked for in various legal sources beyond 
the Civil Code.28 Book four contains the rules of family law, declaring princi­
ples, regulating the institution of marriage, legal aspects of civil partnerships 
under family law, kinship and guardianship. Book five contains the rights in 
rem. This is a book in which norms were adopted mostly from the old Code 
without conceptual modifications and changes. The Codification Committee 
did not feel the need to change the governing conception on property law 
and did not extend ownership to rights.29 Rights in rem are only applicable to 
‘things’ instead of rights and debts. Norms on possession, ownership rights,
26 L. Vekas, C oncep tion  a n d  th e R egu la tory Syllabus o f  th e N ew  C iv il Code, M agyar Közlöny 2003, 
No. 8, p. 8.
27 Civil Code of 2013 Section 2:55.
28 T. Sarközy, Szervezetek  sta tu sjoga  az u j P tk .-ban — Tarsasagi, egy esü lesi es a la p itvan y i j o g  a  Ptk. 
H armadik  K ön yv e  a lap jan , Budapest 2013, p. 12.
29 A. Menyhard, E szrevetelek es ja va s la tok  az u j P o lga ri T örvenykönyv d o lo g i j o g i  k oncepció janak  
kiegeszitesehez, Polgari Jogi Kodifikació 2002, No. 5—6, p. 7—30.
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limited rights in rem (liens, mortgages, rights of use, servitude) and basic 
provisions about the operation and function of the real estate register can be 
found in this book. Book six is by far the longest part of the Code. Law of 
obligations embraces various areas of private law obligations: common provi­
sions relating to obligations, general provisions on contracts, contract types, 
delictual (non-contractual) liability for damages, securities and other facts 
establishing obligations (u just enrichment, negotiorum gestio, implicit con­
duct, offering rewards, public commitments). Book seven contains the rules 
of law of succession. Succession by will became the first and most important 
core of law of succession and reflects the undeniable intention of the Codi­
fication Committee to provide full autonomy to persons to freely dispose of 
their property. Intestate succession is just a core of rules to be applied only 
if the testator died without leaving a valid testamentary disposition or the 
testamentary disposition did not cover all his or her property. Compulsory 
share of inheritance is still maintained in the Hungarian system, granting one 
third of what the closest relatives would be entitled in case of intestate suc- 
cession.30 Book eight has some closing provisions, mainly interpretative rules, 
transitional provisions and references on compliance with the legislation of 
the European Union.
Shifts o f paradigms -  selected novelties o f the new Code
The new Civil Code introduced new or modified rules and legal institutions 
in approximately 30% of its provisions, while another 30% of the rules are 
considered as implementation of the achievements of judicial practice (direc­
tions, court opinions, individual decisions). Around 40% of the provisions 
are either identical in words or at least in content with the provisions of the 
old Code and its separate acts. Significant changes however may be identified 
in several areas of private law. Here, we would like to draw attention to four 
major novelties of the new Code that are not only new legal institutions but 
real shifts in paradigms comparing to the old concept of private law as of 
the Civil Code of 1959. This selection seems to be a very subjective one and 
other authors might emphasize different novelties of the Code. Apart from 
the generally business driven character and regulatory method, we still belie­
ve these four novelties mark real conceptual changes in Hungarian civil law 
and would most likely require a changed attitude in judicial practice as well.
30 The exact amount of this share was established in the Parliamentary debate phase o f codifica­
tion against the original suggestion o f the Codification Committee (the Committee recom­
mended to maintain the old theory of half share).
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Legal competency
Legal competency of a private person is a crucial issue of civil law as it marks 
how actively one may decide in his or her everyday activities and how con­
tractual capacity gets unlimited freedom. For decades Hungarian civil law 
distinguishes three categories of legal competency: full legal competency, 
limited capacity and legal incompetency. Legal incompetency and limited 
capacity might have been a result of two possible factors: age of the person 
(minors under 14 years of age were legally incompetent, while minors be­
tween 14-18 years of age were considered persons with limited capacity) and 
the court could have placed him or her under conservatorship or guardian­
ship. This latter right of the courts allowed them to either limit or exclude 
legal competency of a person even if he had the proper age in order to gain 
full legal competency. Reasons for such intervention would have been men­
tal problems, emotional instability or even addictions. Courts had to decide 
whether these above mentioned disorders are partially limits the ability of 
the person for conducting his affairs (limited capacity) or completely, fully 
and permanently limits this ability (incompetency). This solution in the old 
Code got many criticisms. Putting someone under guardianship and totally 
limiting his legal competency, declaring him incompetent was a very power­
ful instrument in the hand of judges, even if they barely lived with it. The 
new Civil Code seized this power from courts and can only allow them to 
put a person under guardianship or conservatorship while either partially 
or fully limiting but not excluding his/her legal competency completely. In­
competency is no longer an option for courts if the person is over 18 years. It 
might not seem a dramatic change but a change in terminology, however 
both types of competency limitations are ultim a ratio instruments and courts 
must evaluate whether other instruments would serve the interests of the 
person better without limiting his competency. These other instruments may 
be partial limitations on full legal competency only in selected cases and ac­
tivities as the new Code allows judges to put somebody under guardianship 
only in selected cases rather than in all cases with general scope. Another 
instrument to completely avoid any limitations on one’s legal competency 
is advocated decision-making without prejudice to legal competency. Where 
a person of legal age is in need of assistance due to the partial loss of his or her 
discretional ability in certain matters, the guardian authority shall appoint 
an advocate upon his or her request with a view to avoiding conservatorship 
invoking limited legal capacity. If in an action for the placement of a person 
under conservatorship or guardianship the court considers that there is no 
justification to limit that person’s legal competency even partially, yet he/she
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is in need of assistance due to the partial loss of his/her discretionary ability 
in certain matters, the court shall dismiss the action for placement under 
conservatorship or guardianship, and shall deliver its decision to the guar­
dian authority. The advocate is appointed by the guardian authority based 
on the court ruling, in agreement with the person affected.31 This advocated 
decision-making is a giant step toward widening the scope of freedom even 
in the area of law of persons, comparing to the old Code. Not only courts 
cannot seize somebody from his/her legal competency for all cases in general, 
there is also a codified legal institution (advocated decision-making) in order 
to avoid such intervention in somebody’s freedom in acting. Moreover, eve­
rybody of legal age with legal competency are entitled to make a prior legal 
statement executed in an authentic instrument or in a private document co­
untersigned by an attorney, or before the guardian authority in persons, with 
a view to partially or fully limiting his/her legal competency for future con­
siderations. In such prior statement the person may designate one or more 
persons of his/her liking as a conservator, may exclude persons from the list 
of potential conservators or may instruct the conservator as regards the way 
to proceed in his/her specific personal and financial affairs.32 These provisions 
and new rules project a very different and changed attitude of the legislator in 
the whole legal competency problem. We feel the new Code went to the wall, 
granting maximum freedom to those who wish to make prior statements for 
future disorders, while providing more flexibility for judges and the potential 
to individualize every single competency case. One last remarkable novelty 
on this question is that the new Code orders mandatory review of placement 
under guardianship or conservatorship, so there is no permanent mental di­
sorder that could justify any permanent limitation on one’s legal competency 
by the court.33 While these changes are independent from the cobweb-like 
concept of market economy that was a huge motivator of codification, they 
still fit to the general purpose of the Code to open all windows possible for 
completing individual freedom both in private and business relations.
Sanctions fo r violation o f personality rights
Personality rights were always problematic subjects to protect with private 
law instruments. Most civil codes have a constant attempt to restore origi­
31 Civil Code of 2013 Section 2:38.
32 Civil Code of 2013 Sections 2:39-2:41.
33 Frequency of the mandatory review depends on whether court originally partially (every
5 years) or fully lim ited (every 10 years) someone’s legal competency. s ee  Civil Code o f 2013
Section 2:29.
Re-Codifying Civil Law in Hungary 85
nal conditions in case of an infringement and make the injured party whole 
again. Rights related to personality significantly differ from monetary intere­
sts. In the latter case, the damaged goods all have monetary value and it can 
be calculated in a relatively easy and objective way. On the other hand, rights 
related to personality do not even have a commonly accepted definition or 
an exhaustive list. These interests are highly regarded by civil law without 
acknowledging that these rights may bear any monetary value. In case of 
infringement of personality rights, civil law can only use its classic restorative 
institutions that mainly cause monetary loss to the wrongdoer, the tortfeasor. 
Liability for damages exists in this field as well. The old Code defined two 
types of losses: monetary losses and non-pecuniary losses. The latter was equ­
ivalent to inner harms as results of any infringement against rights relating to 
personality. Damages for non-pecuniary loss was a very chaotic legal institu­
tion in Hungarian law for more than a century. While the beginning of the 
20th century applied damages for such infringements against rights relating 
to personality, the Soviet ideology of civil law prohibited the ‘sellout of one’s 
personality’.34 Only the novel in 1977 that amended the old Civil Code re­
-established the possibility to award damages35 for non-pecuniary loss with 
very strict limitations on potential cases (only serious and permanent harms 
were eligible for damages, limiting judicial practice to virtually only physical 
harms, personal injuries, while other rights relating to personality got no pro­
tection through the institution of damages for non-pecuniary loss).36 After 
the political shift, the Hungarian Constitutional Court annulled the pro­
visions on damages for non-pecuniary loss of the old Civil Code37 marking 
the path of a European style, modern personality protection under private 
law. Judges however could not let the old habits die easily, so the ghost­
-like survive of the old and harm-oriented damages concept was sustained 
for almost a decade. In the wake of the 21st century, society needed a much 
more open attitude in personality protection as technological development 
made infringements against rights relating to personality more frequent and 
easy. These infringements mostly constituted non-personal injuries, such as 
harms in human dignity, reputation, image, data protection, etc. In case of 
such personality rights it is almost impossible to verify that the injured party 
suffered tangible, manifested harms obvious to others. As the legal institution 
of damages for non-pecuniary loss was still part of delictual liability law and 
therefore it required some verification of the loss or harm suffered, many cla­
34 T. Fezer, A nem  va gyon i (erkolcsi) serelm ek  m eg ite lese  a p o lg a r i  jo g b a n ,  Budapest 2011, p. 58.
35 Civil Code of 1959 Section 354.
36 T. Acs, A n em  va gyon i karterites, Budapest 2003, p. 273.
37 34/1992 Constitutional Court Decision (June 26th).
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ims were dismissed on the grounds of no evidence for obvious harms. Courts 
slowly moved towards a somewhat contra legem  practice when they imple­
mented an otherwise procedural institution in their judgments, notoriety 
facts. They found that in many cases of infringements against rights relating 
to personality, there is no need to show evidence of some harms, since suf­
fering inner harms as a consequence of such incidents is evident and noto- 
riety.38 Still, courts maintained the right to use the old concept of damages 
and make the plaintiffs provide evidence to their loss or harm if they felt 
that the use of the notoriety concept would be too liberal or the claim was 
insignificant based on possibly petty harms. The new Civil Code came up 
with a brand new idea on compensating non-pecuniary losses. Restitution or 
the more talkative name for the new institution ‘pain award’ was introduced 
to the Hungarian legal system, dismissing the old institution of damages for 
non-pecuniary loss. Any person whose rights relating to personality had been 
violated shall be entitled to restitution for any non-material violation suffe­
red. As regards the conditions for the obligation of payment of pain award 
(restitution) -  such as the definition of the person liable for the restitution 
payable and the cases of exemptions -  the rules on liability for damages shall 
apply, with the proviso that apart from the fact of the infringement no other 
harm has to be verified for entitlement of pain award. The court shall deter­
mine the amount of restitution in one sum, taking into account the gravity 
of the infringement, whether it was committed in one or more occasions, the 
degree of responsibility, the impact of the infringement upon the aggrieved 
party and his environment.39 Pain award is a real change in paradigm. It does 
not request the verification of any harms suffered by the injured party, and 
solely relies on the fact of the infringement hurting rights relating to per­
sonality. Theoretically and with using grammatical interpretation methods, 
if conditions of liability are proved (unlawful act, accountability, causation) 
there is no way the wrongdoer could exempt him or herself with referring 
to the insignificant or petty nature of the possible harm the aggrieved party 
might have suffered. Although this solution seems very similar to the noto­
riety concept developed by judicial practice under the validity of the old Civil 
Code, it goes a lot further than that. Pain award does not leave the option 
for selecting among claims on the grounds of how evident or significant the 
inner harm might be. As the new Code only entered into force on March 15th 
2014 there is no judicial practice exist relating to the new institution of pain 
award. It is difficult to project how judges will use the new norms in cases of
38 BH 2002/186., BDT 2005/1088.
39 Civil Code of 2013 Sec. 2:52.
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personality rights protection, however we still try to provide some possible 
ways of interpretation, even if  it sounds a bit of spellbinding.
One possible solution is to take the grammatical interpretation and award 
restitution in all cases when the unlawful nature of the infringement is pro­
ved and other conditions of liability -  except, of course, the verification of 
any loss suffered -  are met. However, judges may grant insignificant amounts 
as restitution if they feel the presumed inner harm is insignificant and the 
claim is not properly based. These amounts will most likely remain far un­
der the costs of litigation, teaching society that ill-founded litigation is not 
rewarding.
Another possible interpretation would be similar to the Dutch ‘seriousness 
requirement’ clause.40 Judges may interpret the provisions the way the aggrie­
ved party cannot be ordered to prove his/her harm, however judges have 
a right to search for it. As the purpose of restitution (pain award) is not clear 
(is it purely compensation for some presumed or real harm suffered, or does 
it have some punitive character), judges may try to retain as much as possible 
from the practice of damages for non-pecuniary loss, and dismiss all claims 
they consider insignificant or malicious litigation. Functional questions are 
plentiful in case of the new pain award institution. While the norm does not 
say anything about it, moreover emphasize the compensational character of 
restitution (restitution for any non-material violation suffered), the ministe­
rial comments and reasoning attached to the new Civil Code clearly speaks 
about ‘civil law punishment’. We do not favor this interpretation, even if the 
‘apart from the fact of the infringement no other harm has to be verified for 
entitlement to restitution’ text may seem a bit more focused on the perpetra­
tor, as civil law, especially in Hungary never had an intention to introduce 
punitive elements and conquest territories from penal law.
Dispositive rules as the main principle  
in the book of legal persons
We already mentioned that granting the greatest freedom possible to private 
persons and legal individuals in their legal affairs was a flagship principle in 
the long process of drafting the new Civil Code. While the old Civil Code 
and other acts on various legal persons always followed the regulatory method 
of cogent rules in order to ensure the predictability and safety of commercial 
relations, the new Civil Code clearly gave up on this solution. In book three 
on legal persons, the new Code states: ‘as regards relations between members
40 T. Fezer, op. c i t ., p. 130.
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and founders, and between them and the legal person, and as regards the 
organizational structure and operational arrangements of the legal person, in 
the instrument of constitution the members and founders may derogate from 
the provisions of this Act relating to legal persons’ .41 This is a very open clause 
in the Code as the listed relations may cover all potential subjects of civil law 
regulations, so theoretically and with the sole interpretation and application 
of this Subsection of the Code, no rules in book three are cogent, mandatory, 
every single one of them is just a model rule available for derogation. Luckily, 
the next Subsection establishes some limitations on this freedom: ‘members 
and founders [...] may not derogate from the provisions of this Act, if it is 
precluded by this Act; or were any derogation clearly violates the rights and 
interests of the legal person’s creditors, employees and minority members, or 
it is likely to prevent the exercise of effective supervision over legal persons’.42 
The first limitation on derogation is clear and easily predicted. If the Code 
states that any clause of the instrument of constitution to the contrary of 
a rule shall be null and void, derogation is not available for members and fo­
unders of the legal person. The second limitation however is more uncertain 
and makes us ask a question: who should decide on this. In the registration 
process at the establishment stage the company registration court seems to be 
the competent authority. We still think it is very unlikely that the registration 
court that works under very strict and short time limits can individually re­
view the instrument of constitution whether any derogation from the model 
rules in the Code are not clearly hurting the interest of creditors, minority 
members and employees. Most legal persons do not even have employees 
and creditors at that time, so the monitoring would be highly hypothetical. 
Another question is whether the imperative or dispositive nature of a rule in 
the Code is permanent and applicable to all legal persons or a matter of indi­
vidual consideration for the particular legal person under monitor. It seems 
that courts may make a list about the rules in book three and categorize them 
in two boxes: rules that would clearly hurt the interest of creditors, employees 
and minority members, and rules that have no significance in that respect, so 
these are dispositive. There are already several articles debating on the dispo­
sitive or imperative nature of rules in the new Code.43 A common point in 
these articles is that these rules project some long years of unpredictability in 
the judicial practice of law of legal persons. We clearly must wait for a more 
detailed judicial practice to truly understand where the boundaries of this 
freedom can be marked.
41 Civil Code of 2013 Section 3:4, Subsection (2).
42 Civil Code of 2013 Section 3:4, Subsection (3).
43 G. Gado, K ogen s -e  a  d iszpozitiv , Ceghfrnok 2013, No. 9, p. 3 -5 .
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Liability fo r loss caused by non-performance
The Civil Code of 1959 did not constitute separate liability regime for con­
tractual liability in case of non-performance. Delictual and contractual liabi­
lity both shared the same principles, with very few specialties relating to con­
tractual liability.44 Liability was regulated in details in the delictual liability 
chapter of the old Code, and the linking provisions in contract law connected 
the two liability systems together. Liability in its principle form requires fault, 
so accountability of the wrongdoer is a crucial element for establishing it. The 
torfeasor was relieved of liability if able to prove that his conduct was not 
actionable, so he acted the way as it was expected of or by a person, or in 
a particular situation.
The new Civil Code separated the two liability regimes and created strict 
liability in case of liability for any loss caused by non-performance of a con­
tract. The new Code imposes more stringent rules under which a non-perfor­
ming party can be excused from liability comparing to what delictual liability 
norms presume. The only way for a party’s non-performance to be excused 
if it proves that the damage occurred in consequence of unforeseen circum­
stances beyond his control, and there had been no reasonable cause to take 
action for preventing or mitigating the damage.45 The new Civil Code also 
introduced, in principle to limit full compensation of lost profits and other 
losses, the concept of reasonable foreseeability: liability shall not exceed the 
measure of loss that the non-performing party foresaw or could reasonably 
have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract as a likely result 
of its non-performance based on the facts and circumstances attending the 
conclusion of the contract (foreseeability clause)}6
The new Civil Code does not attach liability for non-performance to the 
culpability of the non-performing party. Accordingly, the non-performing 
party will not be excused under the pretext of having taken all measures 
that could be reasonably expected to prevent non-performance. The only way 
for a party’s non-performance to be excused if it proves that it is due to an 
impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably have been 
expected to take the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract. The same concept applies when performance is entrusted to 
another person. The non-performing party is not be liable for loss suffered by 
the aggrieved party to the extent that the aggrieved party contributed to the 
non-performance or its effects.
44 Civil Code of 1959 Section 318.
45 Civil Code of 2013 Section 6:142.
46 Civil Code of 2013 Section 6:143.
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The new Code -  in line with international commercial standards -  es­
tablished strict liability in case of non-performance of a contract with the 
implementation of the foreseeability rule that is a brand new terminology 
in Hungarian civil law. The main reason for this change of concept is that 
in commercial dealings, and particularly in trading, the sanctions on non­
-performance of voluntary contractual obligations are usually be detached 
from the efforts made be the non-performing party. The aggrieved party sho­
uld be able to recover its losses even if the non-performing party has taken 
all measures that could reasonably be expected to prevent non-performance, 
simply because its legitimate expectations were bankrupted on account of 
such non-performance. Moreover, the sanctions included in consequence of 
non-performance of commercial (business) contracts are aimed, first and fo­
remost, at distributing risks and not at repressing the faulty conduct of an 
individual. While the rules of conventional liability are designed to address 
the errors made men as private individuals (culpability), this kind of ap­
proach in commercial (business) contracts is meaningless. It is difficult, and 
frequently impossible to determine whether there is any negligence involved 
(especially from the standpoint of outsiders, like a contracting party or the 
court) mostly because the actions that take place and which ultimately con­
tribute to the non-performance of commercial contracts are impersonal. The 
Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods contains objective 
requirements regarding the excuse of a non-performing party in its Article 
79. In essence, the Principles of European Contract Law also contain similar 
rules for excuse.47
It should be pointed out that since the 1970s this same trend of strin­
gency has also been followed in the Hungarian judicial system, recognizing 
the “lack of accountability” in the contractual relations of economic organi­
zations only if the non-performing party is able to prove that it is due to an 
impediment beyond its control.48 The new liability rule is therefore intends 
to preserve the current judicial practice.
At the same time, let us not overlook the fact that these rules of liability 
pertain not only to breaches of commercial contracts, but also to other forms 
(e.g., medical treatment) of agreements. In these subjects, the principle of ac­
countability, as the gauge of excuse, should be retained, so the legislator had 
to implement new statues in various acts in order to maintain the delictual 
liability rules will be applicable in such contractual relations.
47 United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (1980 Vienna) Art. 8.108.
48 Gf. II. 30 137/1980: BH 1981/330; Gf. V. 30 605/1981: BH 1982/524.
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This proposal is a fine example of integrating common international com­
mercial standards in the new Civil Code. While the new provisions some­
what truly follow the achievements of judicial practice in the past 20 years, 
some brand new attitudes shall be introduced at the same time. The more 
stringent liability regime for breach of a contract required the separate han­
dling of gratuitous contracts, where the new Code maintained the accounta­
bility principle instead of the new, more commercially driven liability rules.49 
Also, the interpretation of foreseeability first as part of the exemption regime, 
second as a limitation on full compensation will require a new line of judicial 
decisions as foreseeability almost only got application in Hungarian court 
cases under the scope of the Vienna Convention that is clearly designed to 
serve the needs of the big business.
Closing remarks
The new Hungarian Civil Code is only valid for a few months and therefore it 
is difficult to evaluate its reception in society and business. There is no doubt 
the country needed a revised core of private law as apart from the merits of 
the old Civil Code and its attached acts, social, technological and business 
development stepped over on some of its old paradigms and concepts. The 
re-codifying process was mainly in the hand of well-respected academics and 
therefore the Code uses very sophisticated legal language leaving almost no 
chance for misinterpretation. On the other hand, the new Civil Code is so 
flexible in terms of the tons of dispositive norms even in surprisingly con­
servative areas (e.g. law of legal persons) that rely on judicial interpretation 
more than even before. Reception of the new Civil Code is very favorable in 
academic circles and both its birth process and the actual act shook civil ju­
risprudence provoking scientific debates on many of its new or newly drafted 
legal institutions. The original goal to create a modern and flexible code that 
is able to serve business and private life at the same time is fulfilled in our 
opinion. Slight modifications and the adoption of other executive acts and 
ordinances will most likely happen in the upcoming few months as codi­
fication is not over yet. A Civil Code governs so many important areas of 
law that it undeniably makes a significant impact on almost all areas of law 
requiring conformity and coherency. We believe that Professor Lajos Vekas, 
leader of the Codification Committee and his fellow drafters created a true 
codex that understands the needs of modern life situations. Our closing re­
mark is that we see the melt of the dividing line between common law and
49 Civil Code of 2013 Section 6:147.
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civil law systems these days, granting more power and freedom of creative 
interpretation to judges than ever before, while getting to the very same or 
at least similar conclusions in typical legal debates. The new Hungarian Civil 
Code is a fine example of this, with its flexible, relatively open norms and the 
careful implementation of international standards and solutions.
Streszczenie
R ekodyfikacja praw a cywilnego na W ęgrzech
Pierwszy węgierski Kodeks cywilny został przyjęty w 1959 roku, w  czasach, w których 
niespecjalnie interesowano się ustanowieniem współczesnego trzonu prawa cywilnego. 
Tak czy inaczej, Ustawa IV z roku 1959 była względnie nowoczesnym osiągnięciem, 
które za sprawą wielokrotnych poprawek służyło potrzebom społeczeństwa obywatel­
skiego przez ponad pół wieku. Na wczesnym etapie reorganizacji reżimu konstytucyj­
nego na Węgrzech po transformacji w 1989 roku rząd zakomunikował potrzebę usta­
nowienia nowego, zrewidowanego Kodeksu cywilnego. W  1989 roku powołano także 
specjalną komisję, która miała opracować podstawy teoretyczne przyszłego kodeksu. 
Niniejsza praca ma na celu opisanie podstawowych kwestii i teorii leżących u podłoża 
nowego kodeksu, a także przedstawienie okoliczności i potrzeb, które doprowadziły do 
przyjęcia nowego Kodeksu cywilnego na Węgrzech, czyli Ustawy V  z 2013 roku. W  po­
niższym tekście przedstawiono pewne ważne zmiany w zakresie koncepcji regulacyjnej 
Kodeksu cywilnego, podkreślając kilka teoretycznych i doktrynalnych nowości w  dzie­
dzinie prawa prywatnego, a szczególnie w zakresie prawa osób oraz odpowiedzialności 
za szkodę wynikłą z naruszenia zobowiązań wynikających z zawartej umowy.
Słowa kluczowe: węgierski Kodeks cywilny, kodyfikacja, prawo osób, prawo handlowe, 
odpowiedzialność cywilna
